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Abstract 
As NASA and its space partners endeavor to develop a 
network of satellites capable of supporting humankind's 
needs for advanced space weather prediction and 
understanding, one of the key challenges is to design a 
space system to operate in the natural space radiation 
environment In this paper, we present a description of 
the natural space radiation environment, the effects of 
interest to electronic or pl~otonic systems, and a sample 
of emerging technologies and their specific issues. We 
conclude with a discussion of operations in the space 
radiation hazard and considerations for risk 
management. 
Introduction 
Among the most challenging aspects of developing 
systems for space is the performance of electronic and 
photonic systems in the natural space radiation 
environment' One should note that the radiation 
hazard for a specific mission is not generic: each 
mission orbit, timeframe, duration, and spacecraft 
design implications (i.e., the varying amount of 
structural shielding in differing satellite configurations) 
derive unique requirements and challenges to the 
system design. This natural space radiation hazard 
varies significantly: 
from missions with severe requirements that fly in 
the heart of the Van Allen belts where trapped 
energetic particles lurk. One such example would 
be a medium earth orbit or MEO. 
to avionics systems in the upper atmosphere that 
are protected from many energetic particle 
concerns, but still must deal with secondary 
particles such as neutrons. The concept of an error 
occurring in critical electronics of a manned 
aircraft is unsettling at best. 
* This paper is declared a work of the U.S. Government and is 
not subject to copyright protection in the United States. 
Long and short term radiation effects such as total 
ionizing dose (TID), displacement damage dose (DDD), 
and single event effects (SEE) provide aerospace 
designers' a myriad of challenges for reliable system 
design. 
Adding' complication to this concern is the use of new, 
emerging, and in some cases unproven technologies 
that often have new or increased susceptibility to 
radiation concerns.* In this paper, we attempt to 
provide a basic understanding of the natural space 
radiation environment's effects on technology as well 
as a discussion of the implications of such effects and 
risk management techniques available to cope with 
them. 
Two items should be noted as well. The first is that we 
are discussing the natural space radiation environment 
and not the induced radiation environment that is of 
concern for military applications. The second is that the 
technology focus of this paper is on electronic and 
photonic technologies. TIus is not to say that other 
technology concerns do not exist, simply that it is 
outside the scope of this presentation. 
The Natural Suace Radiation Hazkd 
The near-Earth natural radiation environment can be 
divided into two categories, the particles trapped in the 
Van Allen belts and the transient environment. Fig. 1 
shows a representation of the environment population. 
The particles trapped in the near-Earth environment are 
composed of energetic protons, electrons, and heavy 
. . ions. The -onsists of gala-osmic 
ray particles and particles from solar events (coronal 
mass ejections and flares). The cosmic rays have low- 
level fluxes with energies up to TeV and include all 
ions in the periodic table. The solar eruptions produce 
energetic protons, alpha particles, heavy ions, and 
electrons. To the first order, all of these particle 
populations are omnidirectional and isotropic. 
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Space also contains a low energy lasma of electrons 
Pz and protons with fluxes up to 10 cm2/sec. In the 
trapped particle regions, the pl&ma is the low energy 
(< 0.1 MeV) component of the charged particles. In the 
outer regions of the magnetosphere and in 
interplanetary space, the plasma is associated with the 
solar wind. Because of its low energy, the plasma is 
easily stopped by thin layers of material so it is not a 
hazard to most spacecraft electronics. However, it is 
Galactic Cosmic It1v Heaw Ions 
The flux levels of the galactic cosmic rays (GCRs) are 
low cornpared to the trapped particles, but they are 
l w d o u s  to spacecraft electronics because their high 
energies make tlletn extremely penetrating. Also, they 
laveJa lugh rate of energy deposition as measured by 
their linear energy transfer (LET) rate. A particle's 
LET is primarily dependent on the density of the target 
material and, to a lesser degree, the density and 
thickness of the shielding material. It is their high LET 
that makes cosmic rays an important contributor to 
single event effects problems for spacecraft, especially 
in orbits where the magnetosphere offers little 
protection. 
The total dose deposition in silicon is only 10 rads/year 
when the GCR environment is at its peak. However, 
when the GCR dose is converted to dose equivalent in 
units of rem for biological systems, it can reach 
dangerous levels for humans. This can be true even for 
low earth orbits where tile effect of the magnetospleric 
attenuation on the fluence levels of cosmic ray particles 
is significant. 
damaging to surface materials and can contribute to Solar Particles 
spacecraft surface charging and discharging 
All particles are isotropic and The particles from s o w  
omnidirectional. spacecraft designers. In fact, for spacecraft in orbits 
e-s particles, they are often the driver for 
Complete discussions of the radiation environment, its setting single event effects requirements. At this time 
measurement, and models can be found in Barth and there is no method for predicting when these events will 
~ ~ e r . ' . ~  occur. Wamings have short lead times and are not dependable. Experimenters have measured single event 
Trauued Protons and Electrons 
The trapped particles pose a signscant radiation threat 
to electronic systems and humans. There are large 
variations in the level of hazard depending on the orbit 
of the spacecraft, solar activity, and magnetospheric 
conditions. Both the protons and electrons contribute to 
total ionizing dose damage. For some electronic parts, 
single event effects induced by protons are also a 
hazard Protons also contribute to degradation due to 
non-ionizing energy loss. Protons are especially 
problematic because of their high energies and 
penetrating power. As mentioned above, low energy 
electrons are the cause of electrostatic discharging 
which can be a serious problem for spacecraft in higher 
altitude orbits (e.g., geostationaryj where they-are 
exposed to more intense electron populations. Higher 
energy electrons can penetrate into the spacecraft, 
collect in insulator materials, and discharge causing 
damage to electronics. In fact, an analysis of system 
anomalies from the CRRES satellite showed that most 
of the anomalies were related to deep dielectric 
discharging.' 
upsets on stverd satellites during solar events and quiet 
times. Harboe-Sprrenesen et al. measured daily SEU 
rates in regions of space where L > 2 and found that, 
during the October 1989 solar particle event, the rates 
increased by factors of 3 to 30 depending on the SRAM 
or DRAM memory type.8 Adams et al. measured a 
similar response to the October 1989 event in memories 
on board the Meteosat-3, which was in a geostationary 
orbit.g Mullen and Ray also observed increased SEU 
rates during the March 199 1 event in GaAs 1K RAMS 
on board the CRRES satellite.'' The solar proton 
component of the solar particle events must also be 
evaluated for the level of degradation damage for both 
ionizing and non-ionizing effects. 
For &stems that must opemte during a solar particle 
event, the effect that both the solar protons and the solar 
heavy-ions lms on single effects rates must be 
evaluated. The heavier ions make only a very small 
contribution to the dose levels. However, single event 
effects induced by solar heavy ions pose a serious 
problem for spacecraft systems that must operate during 
a solar event, because the particle levels are orders of 
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magnitude higher than the background galactic cosmic DDD is essentially the cumulative degradation resulting 
rays. For tile systems tlmt must operate during a solar from the displacement of nuclei in a material from their 
particle event, the effect that both the solar protons and lattice position. Over time, suFficient displacement can 
the heavy-ions has on single effects rates needs to be occur and may change the device or material 
evaluated- It is especially important to take the peak performance properties. Prime sources of DDD exposure 
flux levels into When setting part include trapped protons, solar protons, radioisotope 
requirements and guidelines* One must tllermoelectric generator (RTG) neutrons, and to a lesser 
remember that peak solar particle conditions exist for extent for typically elecmnic systems, 
only a small part of the totill mission time. ' 
electrons. 
Protons from solar particle events also contribute to 
total dose and solar cell damage especially for 
interplanetary missions and those at geostationary and 
in geostationary transfer orbits. Adams et al. measured 
doses with RADFETs on the Meteosat-3 and found that 
doses increased a factor of 20 with the onset of the 
October 1989 event.' 
Natural Soace Radiation Effects on Teclmolom 
The effects from the natural space radiation environment 
may be divided into two categories: long-term and short- 
term. The long-term effects have two separate concerns: 
ionizing and non-ionizing damage. Short-term effects 
are concerned primarily with single particle ionization 
andfor secondary particle formation. One should note 
that even short-term effects may be permanent (i.e., 
destructive single particle events). 
Alternatively, one may view ionizing radiation effects in 
space electronics in two parts: total ionizing dose (TID) 
and single event effects (SEE)." The two effects are 
distinct, as are their requirements and mitigation 
techniques. Though these effects are often a prime driver 
when discussing mission requirements, the non-ionizing 
radiation effects such as displacement damlge dose 
(DDD) must also be ~onsidered.'~ 
TID 
-
TID is a long-term degradation of electronics due to the 
cumulative energy deposited in a material. Typical 
effects include parametric failures, or variations in 
device parameters such as leakage current, tlxeshold 
voltage, etc., or functional failures. Significant sources 
of TID exposure in the space environment include 
trapped electrons, trapped protons, and solar protons. 
DDD 
DDD often has similar long-term degradation 
characteristics to TID, but is a separate physical 
mechanism It should be noted that teclmologies tlnt are 
tolerant to TID are NOT necessarily toler'mt to DDD. 
SEEs 
SEES occur when a single ion strikes a material, 
depositing sufficient energy either through its prime 
strike (e.g., direct ionization via GCR) or by the 
secondary particles that occur from the strike (e.g., 
indirect ionization via protons) to cause an effect in the 
device. The many types of SEE may be divided into two 
main categories: soft errors and hard errors. 
In general, a soft error occurs when a transient pulse or 
bit-flip in the device causes an error detectable at the 
device output. Therefore, soft errors are entirely device 
and design specific, and are best categorized by their 
impact on the device. This is briefly shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Soft Errors 
Single Event 
Functional 
Intenupt (SEFI) 
Single Event 
Transient (SET) 
An SEU that causes 
a conuption in 
device/system 
operation 
A single particle 
induced spike on the 
output of structure 
such as an 
operational amplifier 
or combinatorial 
logic. 
Sample Impact 
Location-specific: 
can corrupt 
program flow or 
data content. 
May halt system 
and require a reset 
or power cycling to 
clear 
Application- 
specific pending the 
shape of the 
transient and it's 
effect on follow-on 
circuitry. 
Hard errors may be - but are not necessarily - physically 
destructive to the device, and may cause permanent 
hnctional effects. Table 2 lists some of the potential 
hard errors thlt can occur. 
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Table 2 Hard Errors 
Event 
Single Event Latchup (SEL) 
SEL - Microlatch 
Single Hard Error (SHE) 
Single Event Gate Rupture (SEGR) 
Single Event Burnout (SEB) 
Description 
A potentially destructive condition illvolving parasitic circuit elements. During a 
traditional or destructive SEL, the device current exceeds the maximum specified for 
the device. Unless power is removed, the device will eventually be destroyed. 
A type of SEL where the devjce current is elevated, but below the device's specified 
maximum. May or may not bk destructive. 
A permanent change in the operation of the device. A common example would be a 
stuck bit in a memory device. 
Destructive burnout of a gate insulator in a power MOSFET 
A highly localized destructive burnout of the drain-source in power MOSFETs (metal 
oxide semiconductor field effect transistors) 
I Single Event Dielectric Rupture I Destructive burnout of a gate dielectric. Most common in one-time programmable I 
Impacts of Svace Radiation Effects 
on Satellite Svstems 
(SEDR) 
Single Event Snapback (SES) 
TIDDDD 
Device parametric and permanent functional 
degradations are the principal failure modes of 
electronics associated with the TIDDDD environment. 
Since TIDIDDD are cumulative effects, radiation 
tolerances of devices are akin to mean-time-to-failure 
(M'l'TF) numbers. This is where the time-to-failure is 
the amount of mission time until the device has 
encountered sufficient dose to cause failure. It should be 
noted that degradation may be gradual or rather abrupt. 
Two examples illustrate this. The first is an increase in 
device leakage current that might gradually double in a 
year's period or in a single orbit. The second is when 
sporadic errors begin occumng after a year in orbit as 
opposed to a hard failure that suddenly occurs. 
devices. 
A reduction in the breakdown voltage of a parasitic transistor that is caused by the 
injection of minority camers from the source diffusion to the well. Snapback also 
causes local loss of functional operation, along with an increase in current. However, 
much smaller currents generally occur as a result of snapback as compared to SEL. 
Factors such as the mission's orbit, launch date, and 
launch length determine the external radiation 
environment. The device exposure to this lizard is then 
determined by the amount of shielding between the 
device and this external environment. Specific 
requirements and design considerations are therefore 
based on device location on or within the spacecraft. 
SEE 
-
Unlike TID/DDD tolerances, SEE rates are probabilistic, 
given as a predicted span of time witlin &licli a SEE 
will randomly occur. That is to say, SEE rate predictions 
are mean-time-between failures (MTBF) as opposed to 
m. 
The system-level impact of SEE depends on the type 
and location of the effect (hard or soft, recoverable or 
not), as well as on the specific system design. Hard 
errors, naturally, are of great concern to system 
reliability, since they may not be recoverable. Soft error 
effects such as the propagation of an SET or SEU 
tluougli a circuit, subsystem, and system may also be of 
particular importance. For example, a device error or 
failure may propagate to critical mission elements, such 
as a command error affecting a thruster firing. There are 
also cases where SEES may have little or no observable 
effect on a system level. In fact, in most designs, there 
are specific areas in which SEUs have less system 
impact from certain radiation effects. A data storage 
recorder utilizing a powerful error detection and 
correction (EDAC) code scheme would fit this category. 
The more critical an SEE is to operational &rfonnance, 
the more strict the requirements levied on that 
component should be. Since SEE presents a functional 
impact to a device, functional analysis enables 
evaluation of severity. The design is viewed in terms of 
function, not by box or physical subsystem. Functions 
are categorized into defined "criticality classes", or 
categories of differing severity of SEE occurrence. For 
example, for a project, there might be tluee criticality 
groups for SEU: error-functional, error-vulnerable, and 
error-critical. Functions in the error-functional groups 
are unaffected by SEUs, whether it be due to an 
implemented error-correction scheme or redundancy. 
Functions in the error-vulnerable group might be those 
that the risk of a low probability is assumable. 
Functions in the error-critical group are functions where 
SEE is unacceptable. 
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It is important to note that, in general, shielding is not radiation concerns. In Ule following section, we'll 
an effective mitigation tool for SEE, unless a device is discuss some ways of reducing the risk of using these 
soft to attenuable protons. technologies. 
Sample Effects on Emerginn Technolopies 
In an effort to increase space system performance in an 
era of reducing resources, many emerging teclnologies 
are being considered for space systems. Unfortunately, 
many of these teclnologies have increased or new 
radiation sensitivities." In addition, spacecraft size is 
shrinking andlor using newer composite materials. This 
provides less effective shielding for sensitive 
electronics. In summary, we are using more sensitive 
devices with less protection. 
All is not lost, however. In this section, we'll describe a 
sampling of emerging technologies and some of their 
A general trend will be pointed out: as systems are 
going faster (data rates > 1 gigabit per second or gbps), 
the SEUISET sensitivities appear to be increasing. 
However, as will be discussed later, the impact of the 
error on a system must be evaluated to determine 
applicability. 
Microelectronics are a staple of space system design. 
Table 3 provides a sample listing of emerging 
microelectronics technologies, technology trends, 
technology characteristics, and potential radiation 
issues and capabilities. 
Table 3. Sample Microelectronics Technologies 
Wide Bandgap (WBG) Sic, GaN, Diamond, AlN 
Technology 
Complementary Metal 
Oxide Semiconductor 
(CMOS) 
CMOS Ultra-Low Power 
(ULp) 
CMOS Silicon-on-Insulator 
(so11 
CMOS Silicon-on-Sapphire 
(sos)  
Silicon Germanium (SiGe) Shrinking feature size 
CMOS-compatible ( are being developed) 
Trends 
Shrinking feature size; 
Reduced voltage levels 
Approaching voltages <<I V 
Improved wafer quality 
Resurgence of older 
radiation hardened 
technology with better 
wafers and smaller feature 
Used in high-speed and 
radio frequency (RF) 
applications 
Suitable for low-noise and 
higher performance; 
radio frequency (RF) GaAs and SiGe (good TIDDDD, 
Should be relatively good for 
Known TIDDDD hardness; 
Known SEU sensitivity; 
SEU-tolerance techniques have 
been demonstrated 
Test data shows relatively good 
TIDDDD hardness; SEU 
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characteristics 
Used in both digital and 
analog circuits 
Can enable reduced 
spacecraft volumelweight; 
May provide increased 
circuit performance 
Suitable for low-noise and 
higher performance; 
Mixed-signal potential 
Suitable for low-noise and 
higher performance; 
Mixed-signal potential 
Mixed-signal potential; sensitivity (tolerance techniques 
Radiation 
SEE sensitivity is suspect; 
TID appears improved with 
shrinking geometries/voltages 
Design-specific; 
CMOS ULP Radiation-Insensitive 
Technology (CULPRiT) Program 
is aimed at a radiation tolerant 
version; 
Initial results are promising 
Design-specific; 
Potential for improved radiation 
tolerance has been demonstrated 
Test data looks promising on 
limited devices 
Another burgeoning arm of teclulology insertion into It should be noted that DDD issues must be carefully 
space systems is photonics. With technologies such as looked at in Uus same manner. An energetic proton as it 
exoticdoped fiber amplifiers and gbps fiber links being tr'ansits a material may lose energy, but that reduced 
used, one must pay attention to radiation issues as well. energy may be Inore hnaging ~ L W  the original proton's 
energy. This is a very complex issue outside of the scope 
components in a fiber system (detectors, of this falk. Thus, we will emplmix mitigation 
transmitters, and optical fiber) should be considered for tecldiques as opposed to ale DDD issue. 
their radiation effects. A summary of radiation lessons 
learned has already been presented and we' refer the 
interested reader to this reference for further detail.I4 
A second point is that most pilotonic links require a 
high-speed electrical interface. In many cases, the 
radiation performance of these electronics can be the 
limiting factor for the system." 
Managing Risk: Mitigation and A C C ~ D ~ M C ~  of 
Radiation Effects Risks". l6 
TIDDDD 
TIDDDD requirements are met through many avenues. 
Naturally, the first option is to procure devices hardened 
to the environment. This is also true for SEE. 
Unfortunately, hardened electronics technology can be 
mcult to obtain (cost, schedule) and lag significantly 
behind that of commercial technologies (two orders of 
magnitude or greater). 
Shielding is an effective TID mitigation tool but may be 
costly in terms of the added weight to tlle spacecraft. 
The radiation environment external to the spacecraft is 
reduced and modified by the amount and types of 
materials between the external environment and the 
electronic device of interest. The spacecraft, instrument, 
electronic boxes, and any other material substance can 
all contribute to shielding. Representing these structures 
in a three-dimensional radiation model provides the 
means of calculating TID via 3-D ray trace methods at 
the component level or electronic box level. For critical 
missions or missions with high radiation environments, 
it is recommended to schedule a 3-D ray trace prediction 
close to the beginning of the preliminary design phase, 
when the spacecraft geometry is reasonably well defined 
and the boxes are arranged into the structure. With tlus 
method, component level and /or box level TID 
requirements can be set for the design. TID 
requirements stemming from this effort will be more 
accurate, and usually lower, than from an ideal geometry 
calculation, allowing for a more efficient design. 
Over-specifying tolerance requirements can be avoided 
with subsequent savings in costs. This overall process 
determines the effective shielding for a component and 
typically reduces the lwdness required by a component 
Slight redesign at the spacecraft andlor subsystem level 
may reduce TID exposure levels without necessarily 
impacting the overall weight budget. Electronic boxes 
placed inside a spacecraft structure receive additional 
radiation shielding from the spacecraft when compared 
to those on the outside of the structure. In addition, 
electronic boxes placed closer together provide more 
shielding to each other than boxes further apart. Internal 
box structures and components also provide shielding. 
In essence, optimizing the mechanical box layout 
(location o d i  the spacecraft) and devices within a box 
(where inside the box the component is located), 
provides a useful mecans of understanding or mitigating 
risk. 
In some cases, the effective shielding may not be 
sufficient to reduce the TID requirement. In these cases, 
additional shielding may be added to the spacecraft with 
all the potential meclmical, thermal, and other design 
and cost constraints that one would expect. Some device 
packaging techniques are designed to increase radiation 
tolerance. However, these devices are typically costly 
and have long lead times for procurement. At a device 
level, spot shielding offers the least impact on the 
weight budget. However, for electronic boxes in which 
large amounts of circuitry must be protected, box-level 
shielding may be the only practical method of reducing 
dose through shielding. 
Devices with unknown radiation tolerance 
characteristics should be replaced by alternates with 
known tolerance or else tested to TID or DDD as 
appropriate. Radiation testing of key devices with 
unknown tolemce early in the design phase reduces the 
risk of schedule and cost impacts required for circuit 
redesign andlor work-arounds. Although device TID 
tolerance may vary by a factor of two or more from lot 
to lot, look ahead testing of devices gives insights into 
their use. In later development phases, testing of the 
flight lot parts is critical for commercial grade devices to 
account for issues such as the lot-to-lot variations that 
ofien occur. 
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Redund'ancy of colnponcrits is often considered as well 
as a me'ans of mitigation. Redundancy with powered-on 
devices is not effective as mitigation, since these 
devices will also degrade at the same rate. Un-powered 
devices may or may not provide a means of mitigation 
(degradation may be less, more, or the same); this is 
very device and technology specific. 
SEE 
For simplicity, SEES, may be divided into four 
categories: those that effect data or data streams, those 
that effect the operation or control of the system, 
transients, and destructive. There is some obvious 
overlap such as a bit error in a memory cell that can 
either be a data error or an error in a stored program 
(which affects operation). 
It is also important to note tld some SEES may be 
acceptable when you look at mission requirements. An 
SEU rate causing a loss of 5% of tile science data may 
be acceptable. 
On the other hand, one also needs to understand when 
the payloads are required to gather data. For example, if 
a mission is looking to gather data during a solar particle 
event, a nominally accepted SEE rate (say, once a day) 
may not be acceptable during this event time period. 
Data 
There are several options for data-related SEU 
mitigation using encoding schemes on the device or data 
structure. First, parity checking is a "detect only" 
scheme, which counts the number of logic one states 
occurring in a data set, producing a single parity bit 
saying whether an odd or even number of ones were in 
that structure." This scheme will flag an SEU if an odd 
number of bits are in error, but not if an even number of 
bits are in error. 
A second option, Hamming code, is known as single bit 
correct, double bit detect. The use of EDAC schemes 
such as this, known as scrubbing, is common among 
current solid-state recorders flying in space [for 
example, refs '8.'9]. Hamming code schemes encode an 
entire block of data with a check code; this method will 
detect the position of a single error, and Uie existence of 
more than one error in a data structure." Because the 
SEU position is known; it is possible to correct this 
error. This coding method is recommended for systems 
with low probabilities of multiple errors in a single data 
structure (e.g., only a single bit in error in a byte of 
data). 
Otltcr block error codes provide more powerful error 
correcting codes (ECCs). Alllong these, Reed-Solomon 
(R-S) coding is becoming widespread in its usage.*' The 
R-S code is able to detect and correct multiple and 
consecutive errors in a data structure. An example 
[ref 2'] is wlkzt is known as (255,223), or a 255 byte 
block with 223 bytes of data and 32 bytes of overhead. 
This particular R-S scheme is able to correct up to 16 
consecutive bytes in error, and is available in a single IC 
designed by the NASA VLSI Design Center.*' A 
modified R-S code for a SSR has been performed by 
software as 
Convolutional encoding differs from block coding by 
interleaving the overhead or check bits into the actual 
data stream rather than being grouped into  word^.^ This 
provides good immunity for mitigating isolated burst 
noise, and is particularly useful in communication 
systems'. 
Mitigation may also be performed at the system level or 
with an overlying system protocol. Typical error 
detection schemes as described above may be used, and 
error correction may be accomplished by rewriting or re- 
transmitting data. A combination of EDAC techniques 
may be most effective. 
The above methods provide ways of reducing the 
effective bit error rate @ER) of data storage areas such 
as solid-state recorders and communication paths or data 
interconnects. Table 4 summarizes sample EDAC 
methods for memory or data devices and systems. 
Control 
The above techniques are useful for data SEUs, and may 
also be applicable to some types of control SEUs as 
well. Highly integrated devices such as VLSI circuitry 
or microprocessors leave the system potentially more 
vulnerable to hazards such as issuing an incorrect 
Table 4. Sample EDAC Methods for Memory or Data 
Devices and Systems 
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EDAC Method 
Parity 
Hamming Code 
RS Code 
Convolutional 
encoding 
Overlying protocol 
EDAC Capability 
Single bit error detect 
Single bit correct, double bit detect 
Correct consecutive and multiple 
bytes in error 
Corrects isolated burst noise in a 
communication stream. 
Specific to each system 
implementation 
co~nm,md .to a subsystem, or functionally intcrmpting 
system operations. Additionally, many newer devices, 
especially microprocessors, luve hidden registers not 
accessible external to the device, which provide internal 
device control and affect device or system 
operation. Microprocessor software tasks or subroutines 
dubbed Health and Safety (H&S) may provide some 
SEE mitigation [ref 24]; H&S tasks may include memory 
scrubbing with parity or other code methods on external 
devices, or on registers internal to the microprocessor. 
They also might use internal hardware timers to set 
watchdog timers (some type of message is sent 
indicating health of a device or system) or to pass H&S 
messages between spacecraft systems. 
Redundancy between circuits, boxes, systems, etc. 
provides a potential means of recovery from an SEE on 
a system. Autonomous or ground-controlled switching 
from a prime system to a redundant spare may provide 
system designers an option, depending on spacecraft 
power and weight restrictions. Alternately, lockstep 
operation uses two identical circuits performing 
identical operations with synchronized clocking, a 
technique often used with ~nicro~rocessors.~~ Errors are 
detected when the processor outputs do not agree, 
implying that a potential SEU has occurred. The system 
then has the option of reinitializing, etc. However. for 
longer spacecraft mission time frames, lockstep circuits 
using commercial devices may cause TID-induced 
problems; clock skew with increasing dosage may cause 
false triggers when the lockstep devices respond to the 
dosage differently. Voting takes lockstep systems one 
step further: with three identical circuits, choose the 
output that at least two agree upon. Katz, et al. provide 
an excellent example.26 They have proposed and SEU- 
tested a triple modular redundancy (TMR) voting 
scheme for FPGAs. FPGAs provide higher gate counts 
and device logic densities than older LSI circuits; while 
this reduces the IC count for spacecraft electrical 
designs, with the TMR scheme you essentially lose over 
two-thirds of the available FPGA's gates. 
Good engineering practices for spacecraft provide other 
means of mitigation.27 Utilizing redundant command 
structures (two commands trigger an event with different 
data or addresses), signal power margins, etc. may aid 
an SEU hardening scheme. These and other good 
engineering practices usually allow designers to be 
innovative and discover sufficient methods for SEU 
mitigation as needed. Unknown device or system SEE 
characteristics provide the greatest risk to a system and 
conversely, the greatest challenge to an electrical 
designer. 
SETs 
Standard filtering techniques such as R-C filter circuits 
are effective means of reducing or eliminating SETS. 
Several things should be noted, however. Fist, SETS 
can be very application specific. For example, an analog 
comqarator may have vastly different SET sensitivity in 
tenns of transient slupe and occurrence rates based on 
the circuit bias, power supply, etc ... Second, adding 
filters can reduce the bandwidth of a circuit (i.e., the size 
of a valid pulse must be large enough to pass through the 
filter). 
Destructive Issues 
Destructive conditions may or may not be recoverable 
depending on the individual device. Hardening from the 
system level is difficult at best, and in most cases, not 
particularly effective, due to several concerns. First, 
non-recoverable destructive events such SEGR or SEB 
require redundant devices or systems to be in place since 
the devices fail when tlus occurs. SEL may or may not 
have this same effect and is very device specific. 
Microlatch, in particular, is to detect since the 
current consumption of this condition may be within that 
of nonnal device operation. LaBel has demonstrated the 
use of multiple watchdog timeout conditions as a 
potential mitigation scheme.28 A similar concern exists if 
current limiting is performed on a card or higher 
integration level: a single device may see SEL at a high 
enough current to destroy itself, but not at a sufficient 
current to trigger the overcurrent protection on the card. 
Current limiting circuits to cycle power on individual 
devices are often considered, but failure modes of this 
protection circuit are sometimes worse than finding a 
less SEL-sensitive device (e.g., infinite loop of power 
cycling may occur). Hence, SEL should be treated by 
the designer on a case-by-case basis considering the 
device's SEL response, circuit design, aid protection 
methods. A risky method of SEL protection on SEL- 
vulnerable devices involves reading the device's current 
periodically, and cycling power if the current exceeds a 
specified limit. Tlus method can use either telemetry 
points or device calibration parameters to be 
successfi~l.~~ 
Sam~le Methods of I~n~roving Designs for SEE 
Perfonnlmce 
By changing circuit design or parameters, improved 
SEU performance may be gained. Marshall [ref 30] and 
LaBel [ref ''1 have demonstrated ways of improving a 
fiber optic link's BER from SEU by choice of diode 
material (111-V versus Si) resulting in a significantly 
smaller device sensitive volume, method of received 
signal detection (edge versus level sensitive) defining a 
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dynamic sensitive time window, and optical power 
margin (BER decreases with increased margin). These 
and similar teclmiques 11uy apply to other designs as 
well. 
Sum~nary 
We have presented an overview of the natural space 
radiation environment, its effects and how they relate to 
emerging technologies, and finally, a treatise on 
radiation risk reduction for electronics systems. The 
expectations are that as teclmologies evolve and 
emerge, new effects and concerns may be expected. 
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Sample Emerging Technologies* 
* Managing the Radiation Risk 
Discussion 
Acknowledgements 
* Emphasis is on technologies applicable to electronic systems 
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4aiP' Spacecraft Design Reality 
Design Considerations: Programmatic Considerations: 
* Reduced Weight 
Reduced Power 
Consumption 
Increased Performance 
Requirements 
Increasingly Complex 
Sensor Arrays 
* Decreased Availability of 
Rad-hard Devices 
Reduced Cost 
Use of Flight Heritage 
Designs 
Mass-Buy Procurement 
Decreased Procurement 
Lead Times 
* Overlapping Development 
Schedules 
* Reduced Manpower 
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@Desirable Electronics Features for Future 
I NASA Missions 
Higher functional 
integrationldensity 
- System-on-a-chip 
Modular system design 
Advanced packaging 
techniques 
Low and ultra-low power 
Fault totermt 
Reconfigurable systems 
Rapid prototypinglsimulation 
Scalable real-time 
multiprocessing 
Operation at cold temperature 
High-bandwidth 
communications and free 
space interconnects 
Increased processing capability 
- On-board autonomy, data 
reduction 
Increased reliability 
* Integr9ted power management 
and distribution 
* Radiation tolerance 
* Availability, cost, ... 
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Space Radiation Environment 
Nikkel Saence, Inc. of fapan, by K. Endo 
Janer Rorrh hrrp radhonte g\/c nuso gov ra&unre paperr up1 322 p# 
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The Radiation Environment 
Galactic Cosmic Rays 
I 
I 
Protons > 10 MeV 
Solar Events 
* 
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!#ID' Radiation Effects and Spacecraft 
Three areas are critical for design in the natural space 
radiation environment 
- Long-term effects 
Total ionizing dose (TID) 
Displacement damage dose(DDD) 
- Transient or single particle effects (Single event effects or SEE) 
Soft or hard errors 
* Mission requirements and philosophies vary to ensure 
mission performance 
- What works for a shuttle mission may not apply to a deep-space 
mission 
Resented by K ~ I U X U I  A Lase1 Amencan Instme ofAemnelrhcs and Astmnaulrcs. Seplember 2529.20W. Long Beach CA 
Basic Radiation Effects 
on Devices: Long-term Effects 
* TID 
- long-term degradation due to cumulative ionizing dose deposited 
in a device 
- effects may include: 
parametric changeslfailures 
increase in leakage current 
threshold voltage shifts 
functional failures, etc ... 
DDD 
- may have similar effects as TID, but caused by non-ionizing 
effects 
Note: TID hardness does not necessarily imply DDD hardness 
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Basic Radiation Effects 
on Devices: Transient Effects 
SEE 
- event caused by a single ion strike depositing 
sufficient energy in a device to cause an effect 
- two basic categories: 
soft errors which include: Upset (SEUs), Transients (SETS) 
and Functional Interrupts (SEFI) 
- examples: bit flip in a memory cell, a change of state in a 
program counter, a change of configuration in a RAM-based 
FPGA 
hard errors which include: Hard errors (SHE), Gate Rupture 
(SEGR), Burnout (SEB), Dielectric Rupture (SEDR), and 
Latchup (SEL) 
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45' 
Radiation Effects and?he Hazard 
Total Ionizing Dose Displacement 
- Trapped Protons & Electrons Damage Dose 
- Solar Protons - Protons 
Single Event Effects - Electrons 
- Protons - Neutrons 
Trapped 
Solar 
- Heavier. Ions 
Galactic Cosmic Rays 
Solar Events 
- Neutrons 
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Microelectronics 
Trend: increased performance (re: higher speed and 
lower power) andlor device integration. 
* Microelectronics encompasses multiple technologies 
including: 
- Silicon 
- Compound Semiconductor 
Rank of the available technologies by their speed 
performance capabilities: 
- Si, overlapped at its upper range by SiGe, 
- SiGe overlapped at its upper range by GaAs, 
- GaAs overlapped at its upper range by InP 
th7- by K e m h  A L a m  Amencan insl*u(e 0fA~mnaut1w and Asbvnautlu, Semmber 2629. 20W Lonp &acn CA. 1 
Radiation Issues for Newer Technologies 
Proton induced single event upsets 
* Proton induced single event latchup 
Neutron & Alpha induced upsets 
Single events in Dynamic RAMs 
Displacement damage in electronics 
Single event functional interrupt 
Stuck bits 
Block errors in.Dynamic RAMs 
Single event transients 
* Neutron induced single event effects 
Hard failures & latchup conditions 
Multiple upsets from a single particle 
Feature size versus particle track 
Microdose 
Enhanced low dose rate 
Reduced shielding 
Test methods for advanced 
packaged devices 
Ultra-high speed & novel devices 
(e.g., photonics, InP Ics) 
Design margins & mitigation 
COTSvariability 
At-speed testing 
Application-specific sensitivities 
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Ultra-Low Power (ULP) Technology 
Microelectronics 
Prime Driver: 
Hand-held products that require: 
High levels of integration, and 
very low power consumption 
Advantages: 
Reduced power consumption with VCC <1V 
Allows for enabling volume shrinkage for 
- -  
space application 
1024-point May: 
FFT processor Provide true "nanosat" technology 
Applications: 
Mostly digital at this time 
Radiation Issues: 
Upset sensitivity 
Rad-tolerant effort at University of New Mexico 
Comment: 
Other reliability issue such as ultra-thin 
silicon dioxide gate dielectr~cs 
2ob1t x 20bit Electromigration issues with min~mum pitch I - Pipelined Multiplier interconnect I 
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SO1 Technology 
Prime Driver: 
Hand-held products that require: 
High levels of integration, and 
very low power consumption 
Advantages: 
Reduced power consumption 
Low noise 
Performance improvements 
May: 
Provide commercial solution to soft error 
sensitivity at reduced power supply voltages 
Applications: 
Digital, analog, mixed signal 
Sample devices: 
Mongoose V processor 
256 kbit SRAM 
* 1.2V operation comparable to r2V bulk device 
Radiation Issues: 
Robust to SEE 
TID varies 
Comment: 
Issues of yield/production 
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GaAs Semiconductors 
Driver: 
Cellular telephones and wireless communications 
Advantages: 
High operational speed and linearity 
~bi l i ty to operate at reduced power~supply voltages 
Current trends: 
Higher integration 
Representawe cras r a m  of a m a d  
Mcrabaam accekrwmtef The a p p m d  &na 
 educed sibstrate costs 
pmz&e&nc thm film wm, mrmm&ned drvnurar 
on a GPAl subsnde vnm MESFET stwlnmrr May: 
M Q ~  mpru ccmlmmm~~U~-m Be ideal for multi-frequency (re: dual-band) phones 
Applications: 
Analog. digital, or mixed signal 
- - - 
Radiation Issues: 
SEU sensitivity 
Comments: 
Emerqence of Complementary GaAs (CGaAs) or other 
32 nit t ' ~ ; ~ . ~ ~ . ~ r l d c r  more SEU-tolerant technologies (LT buffers) 
hzlp m r p m m l r n y , n  m d r  alu &hrmn 3 1 b ~ ~ e  hml Increased density and reduced power consumption 
traded w~th operatrng speed (clGHz) 
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SiGe Semiconductors 
Driver: 
Handheld products 
Advantages: 
Higher Speed than Si (>40 GHz possible) 
Compatible with existing Si technology 
Low noise floor and high power gain imply 
mixed-signal (cellular phone-on-a-chip) potential 
I SiGe lC May be "tunedn by selective doping Mav: 
Compete with Ill-V semiconductors 
Applications: 
Digital, analog, mixed signal (cellular phone-on-a-chip) 
Sample Device: 
12-bit DAC with I .2 Gbps operation 
- outperforms comparable bipolar devices 
Radiation Issues: 
Preliminary TID and displacement damage results 
look promising 
SEU sensitivity demonstrated 
Cross-Section 
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InP Semiconductors 
Mobile communications 
ki Low phase noise 
~ x k l l e n t  thermal conductivity 
Compatibility with Si 
I May: Provide an "ideal" space sol~t i in 
Applications: 
Digital, mixed signal primarily 
Radiation Issues : 
Preliminary results promising 
Comments: 
Still in prototype stage 
Material quality and availabilRy 
A wmpamon 01 InP HBT dlred-upled ampl&rs 
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Wide Bandgap (WBG) Semiconductors 
Sample Technologies: 
Sic, GaN, Diamond, and AIN 
Advantages: 
High temperature and power density levels 
High thermal conductance 
High electron carrier velocities 
May: 
Replace some Si-based or high-frequency Vacuum 
tube technologies while reducing weight, power 
and complexity 
Applications: 
MMlCs for phased array radar power amplifier, 
cross-and doyn-link power amplifiers, 
power conversion products 
novel packaging 
Radiation Issues: 
Open 
Comment: 
Materials fabrication issues 
Material quality and availability 
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1 @ Fiber Optic System Applications 
Prime Driver: 
Terrestrial telephone and communication links 
Advantages: 
Reduced volume, weight 
Increased performance (>1 Gbps) 
Reduced EMIEMC 
Architectural scalability 
May: 
Replace existing command and data interfaces 
Applications: 
I FOOB CFBIU MCM Data and command transfer 
M~croelectronlcs and Photonics Test Bed 
Sample Developments: 
PFODB, SFODB, commercial:FC, ethernet ... 
Radiation Issues: 
Design dependent 
Associated electronics are often the radiation drive 
Hardening approaches possible 
Comment: 
Many new technologies emerging 
Several systems currently in space 
Higher (ie: slGbps) rate systems sought ' 
(image processing, optical processing, ...) 
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4lBr 
Space Radiation Effects lssdes for Fiber Links 
* Issues include: 
- Darkening in passive optical components (fibers, lenses, etc.) 
Choices may be made to minimize concerns such as the use of pure silica 
fiber and not using graded index (GRIN) lenses 
- Displacement damage . 
Primarily driven by proton fluences encountered and choice oftechnology 
(Si, GaAs) 
- Support electronics 
May drive system tolerance to radiation effects 
I - Single proton effects in receivers Causes bit errors in data stream (i.e. increases, bit error rate or BER) 
- Mitigation of Single Proton Effects in Receivers 
Choice of detector: Ill-V direct bandgap @ higher wavelengths vs. Si (or 
similar) indirect bandgap 
Circuit hardening approaches 
System level solutions 
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Metal Semiconductor Metal (MSM) 
Detectors 
r v  Prime Driver: 
Terrestrial communication (telephone, internet, ...) 
Advantages: 
High-speed photodiode with lower power consumption 
Monolithic integration with FET possible 
Available in multiple wavelengths 
- 
A me.taCsmc0ndudor-me.taI 
(MSM) photodeteuor May: 
Allow true monolithic receiver 
00 Applications: 
Commercial fiber links such as ethernet, 
rm fibre channel (FC), ... 
- 
E - 
% "I Hardened systems 
d Radiation Issues: 
Preliminary results are encouraging 
"I 
0 5 I 0  15 W 
TID tolerant 
mr lPI1 
Some SEU sensitivity 
3 2 ps. 140  OH^ MSM phatcdetemr 
on stlbn-on-mulator (SO#) 
Wlhr* LS m ~ . m O I 7 I ~ b I  
RIENIIIXIX.IUSVPM~.=U mm 
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Vertical Cavity Surface Emitting Lasers 
(VCSELS) 
I Alternative to current edge-emitting lasers and LEDs 
Advantages: 
Lower power consumption and reduced mass 
High aggregate throughput 
Integration (monolithic) with detectors and electronics 
May: 
Provide a "fiber-less" system 
Applications: 
Wavelength division multiplexing (VVDM) for high 
throughput systems 
Smart pixel array (SPA) systems 
Commercial (terrestrial) data links (FC, ethernet, ...) 
Sample Developments: 
HP VCSEL ethernet 
Honeywell's DARPA system 
Radiation Issues: 
Preliminary data available (looks promising) 
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VCSELs and MSMs lntegrated on a 
Single Substrate 
I Schematic Cross Section of the Integrated Device Structures 
Trend is to form a true monolithic optoeiectronic IC (OEIC) 
hrrp a n r p ~ m u  rdu vcwl ~rchtp -111 
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Applications of VCSEL.based Smart 
Pixel Arrays 
htrp ~ " n u w d c r  mlwodo edui-benornsjreseoreh hml 
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@ Radiation Risk Management: Levels of 
Hardening 
TransistorIlC* 
Circuit designlboard* 
Subsystem and system 
Satellite systems (constellations) 
"Emphasized in this talk 
Implies building an IC that meets system 
radiation requirements (call this a rad-hard or RH 
device) 
Features may include: 
- TID hardness or SEL immune process 
- Hardened transistors 
- Internal redundancylvoting 
- Internal error correction, etc. 
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IC Hardening (2) 
Advantages 
- Simplifies system design to meet radiation 
requirements 
Challenges 
- Performance, Cost, Schedule 
I * Examples 
- Hardened process 
- Compiled or hardened library design 
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Circuit ~ a r d e n i n ~  (1 ) 
Implies adding radiation mitigation external to 
an IC 
- Shielding 
- RC filter 
- Voting logic 
- Error detection and correction (EDAC) codes 
- Watchdog timers, etc. 
Maybe be implemented or controlled by either 
hardware, software, or firmware 
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Circuit Hardening (2) 
Advantages 
- Allows use of higher (non-radiation) performance 1Cs 
* Faster processors 
* Denser memories, etc.. . 
Challenges 
- Adds complexity (cost and schedule?) to design 
* Cost and schedule 
- Often difficult to retrofit 
Modification to flight hardware 
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@Digression: Evaluating Your internal 
Radiation Requirement 
The radiation hazard INSIDE the spacecraft may be / vastly different than that OUTSIDE the spacecraft 
A 3-0 ray trace is recommended to determine the 
effective shielding surrounding a component 
May help mitigate some TIDIDDD issues (SEEs are not 
effectively shielded) 
- Placement of boxes closer together , 
- Movement of sensitive component to center of spacecraft or box 
Note: composite structures offer less shielding when 
compared to old-style aluminum 
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4lr Mitigation of SEEs - SEUs 
I * Three types of SEUs I 
- Data (Ex., bit-flip to a memory cell or error on a 
communication link) 
- Control (Ex., bit-flip to a control register) 
- Transient (*see paper for details) 
* Some overlap: Ex., RAM with program memory 
stored inside 
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/a Data SEUs - Sample Error Detection 
and Correction (EDAC) Methods 
EDAC Method EDAC Capability 
Parity Single bit error detect 
Cyclic Redundancy Detects if any errors have occurred in a 
Check (CRC) given structure 
Hamming Code Single bit correct, double bit detect 
Reed-Solomon Code Corrects multiple and consecutive bytes 
in error 
Convolutional Code Corrects isolated burst noise in a 
communication stream 
Overlying Protocol Specific to each system. Example: 
retransmission protocol 
SeaStar Flight Data Recorders (FDRs) SEU 
I Counts 
Daty SEU Cowus for BMh FDRr. 
h u s h  Aug 31. 2WO 
H-- Mean* - L 
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4ilr 
Control SEUs - Sample EDAC Schemes 
* Software-based health and safety (H&S) tasks 
* Watchdog timers 
Redundancy 
* Lockstep 
Voting 
* IC Design techniques 
* "Good engineering practices" 
Improved Designs 
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m Destructive Conditions - Mitigation 
* ~ecommendation 1 : Do not use devices that exhibit 
destructive conditions 
Difficulties: 
- May require redundant components/systems 
- Conditions such as microlatch difficult to detect 
Mitigation methods 
- Current limiting 
- Current limiting w/ autonomous reset 
- Calibration of device 
* MANY DESTRUCTIVE CONDITIONS MAY NOT BE 
MITIGATED 
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